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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
+++++++++++++ 
"Simply stated, the Persian Gulf does not contain a power vacuum 
when considered as a separate regional entity. But, when the 
region is placed into an international context (because of its 
oil resources and str.ategic location), great powers perceive a 
power vacuum and, therefore, think in terms of exerting some 
influence in the region." 
Major John J. Ruszkiewicz, USA, MILITARY REVIEW, October 1973 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Some important considerations of foreign policy and power politics are 
the topics of discussion in this BAROMETER FEATURE by Major Ruszkiewicz entitled, liThe 
Power Vacuum In The Persian Gulf.11 The author is presently at the U.S. Military Academy 
after serving two Middle Eastern tours and being designated a Foreign Area Officer Specialist. 
FEATURE: THE POWER VACUUM IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
liThe term "power vacuum" has come to be associated with the Persian Gulf for a variety 
of reasons and with varying degrees of validity. It is a term which has less currency within 
the Persian Gulf states. Those states are the focus of this article which addresses their 
ability to fill the so-called power vacuum themselves by organizing a regional subsystem 
which would promote stability and orderly change. The perspective here is that of the 
littoral Gulf states, not that of an external power. 
In the Gulf region, societies have been more traditional than in other parts of the 
Middle East, governed by monarchies which derive their power from the ability to unite 
various tribal factions and to hold them together. Rather than identifying himself with 
the sheikdom or sultanate in which he dwells, the loyalty of an Arab tribesman is personal 
and directed toward his tribe or sheik. The concept of political allegiance to a territorial 
political unit does not exist on the Arabian Peninsula, thus precluding the establishment 
of a system of impersonal succession. 
Implicitly or otherwise, the British policy of maintaining stability in the Gulf had the 
effect of holding local conflicts in check, a situation from which emerged the contention 
that British policy in the Gulf had been one of maintaining the political status quo in the 
region. Nevertheless, one of the results of prolonged British presence was the institution-
alization of the small states which existed at the time of British arrival in the Gulf. It 
seems unlikely that these small states would have been able to survive otherwise, much less 
acquire their distinct characteristics. 
Achieving regional cooperation for the purpose of maintaining stability in the Gulf 
requires: 
*The preservation of order within each country. 
*The creation or existence of a military force sufficient to consitute a "force in 
being ll that could maintain stability without initiating an arms race. 
*And, lastly, some means of laying to rest the natural suspicions that Gulf states 
have of each otherls territorial ambjtions. 
The preservation of order in each Gulf state requires a leadership capable of walking 
the fine line between traditional patterns and pressures toward development and modernizati-
on. We have seen the effects of extremist nationalist movements in other Arab states (e.g., 
Syria) where the process of change was more ~J~ruptive than orderly. In some instances, the 
intervention of an outside power ~~ibuted'to ~he preservation of disequilibrium. Though 
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there are no conclusive indications that the situation in the Persian Gulf region can be 
described as a calm before the storm, the prevailing relative calm may simply be the residual 
of the recent British presence. After so many years of feeling the ever-present restraining 
hand of the British, the Gulf states have yet to realize fully that this influence no 
longer exists. 
The creation and subsequent acceptance of a military force which would function as a 
stabilizing influence throughout the Gulf region Is not a simple matter. Witness the 
reluctance of the newly formed Federation of Arab Emirates to address itself to this problem 
since its not-so-ausplclous beginning In 1968. In the Gulf region, there are two kinds of 
states: larger states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq which are considered nations in 
the normal sense of the word, and the tiny (sometimes rich) sheikdoms, Bahrain, Qatar and 
the former Trucial States which are hardly big enough in population or territory to survive 
as independent entitles In todayls world. To these small states, the question of a regional 
federation (protective shield?) applies and, in actuality, may represent ultimate survival. 
States with military forces In being are not inclined to consider the reduction of elimina~ 
tion of their forces in deference to a regional force or a federation force which would play 
the role of maintaining regional stability. Individual states take for granted the trappings 
of sovereignty which Include a traditional "palace guard" and concern over its loyalty. A 
strong regional or federation military force poses a threat to the loyal palace guard. 
Governments of states subject to Internal political upheaveal do not take kindly to an 
external force which could be employed in support of an oppostiion faction. 
As is the case with Arab concern over Israelis territorial interests, the roots of 
Gulf state suspicions over each otherls territorial amibitions go back many years. Whjle 
British presence prevent these ambitions from erupting into conflict, the lack of such 
activity does not mean that these problems no longer exist or that the states involved have 
relinquished past claims. Iranls action on 30 November 1971 in occupying the island of 
Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tumbs at the mouth of the Persian Gulf is illustrative in 
this regard. Most of the Arab reaction to this occupation was verbal. Iraqis rreaction 
included severing relations with Iran and Great Britain, as well as criticizing Kuwait for 
not exerting stronger leadership in the Gulf to stimulate more positive Arab action against 
Iran. Saudi Arabia, which has made a considerable effort to cooperate with Iran despite 
their differences, did not object strongly to Iranls actions. In reply to Arab objections, 
Iran announced that It had re-establlshed sovereignty over an area that had been denied it 
for 80 years because of British colonial policy. 
REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 
The Gulf states, including Iran and Iraq, must further adjust to Saudi Arabials growing 
prominence In the region. Although Saudi Arabials population and military forces are not 
very large, its presence represents a restraint upon any Iraqi attempt to assert its claim 
to all of Kuwait. Iran, a non-Arab state, considers cooperation with Saudi Arabia as an 
essential bridge to better rleations with the Arab littorals. Saudi Arabials influence in 
the region stems from massive oil reserves and from the holy places of Islam being within 
its borders. However, the traditional system of government, stemming from the consolidation 
of various tribal groups into an empire by Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, does not provide a solid 
foundation from which to express regional ambitions actively, or to exert a dynamic leader~ 
ship role in Gulf affairs. In the absence of a strong Arab contender, Iran has apparently 
stepped forward to assume a regional leadership. 
Iranls intentions 100m very large in any discussion concerning the emergence of a new 
equilibrium in the Gulf. In a special sense, Iran is a loner in the region. Not an Arab 
country, Iran has demonstrated a willingness to oppose the Arab states l regional interests 
either politically vis-a-vis Israel or economically vis-a-vis oil. The largest country to 
border the Gulf, when one considers collectively such factors as size, population and ~ 
economic potential, Iran wasted little time in announcing Its future amlbitions in the Gulf 
after the British withdrawal announcement. Coming only two years after the United States 
had terminated formal economic aid and had reduced military aid (implying that Iran had 
achieved "developed" status), the British withdrawal announcement came at an opportune time. 
In the last four years, Iran has attempted to prove that, indeed, it is militarily and 
economically capable of providing the strength necessary to ensure stability in the Gulf 
region. Economically, oil reserves are the basis of Iranls phenomenal growth. The life 
line for this growth is the Persian Gulf which must remain open and not be subject to hostile 
interference. Politically, Iran seems to have staked its renewed world position on its 
attempts to achieve regional primacy. Amid the spectacle of events surrounding Iranls 
celebration of 2500 years of continuous monarchy at Persepolis during 1971-72 can be found 
renewed interest in its geogolitical importance as the crossroads between East and West. 
Politcally and economically, Iran has come of age and intends to prove it by way of its 
influence in the Persian Gulf. 
Militarily, Iran is the strongest state bordering the Fulf and, for that reason, is the 
most capable of ensuring stability in the region and is quite capable of handling any local 
emergency. Iranls navy represents the dominant regional force in the Gulf. Consisting of 
an estimated 9000 personnel, a destroyer and five frigates equipped with missiles and 20 to 
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25 lesser craft, its navy represents a sizable force by Gulf standards. None of the other 
Gulf states, including Iraq, have naval vessels larger than patrol craft. Backed by an air 
force equipped with F40 and F5 fighters, Iranls military presence far exceeds any PQten~ial , 
regional rival. 
The limiting factor facing Iran In ensuring stability in the Gulf is achieving the 
necessary degree of regional cooperations to do so. In an area where the guns of your 
neighbors worry you more than those "polnted: In your dIrection from afar, the emergenc, 
of a local power Is looked upon with suspicion. For Iran, this suspicion stems not only 
from the natural distrust of the littoral Arab states, but also from Saudi Arabia which is 
considered an economic and political rival, and from Iraq whose differences with Iran stem 
from the Kurdish question, as well as from border and ideology disputes. Recent develop-
ments indicate Iran and Saudi Arabia have common interests in maintaining, Gulf stability 
and keeping radical movements under control. However, because of their 011 Interests and 
traditional systems of government, a number of obstacles prevent complete cooperation. Even 
in a sellerls market, both countries see the United States as a significant and potential 
consumer for their expanded oil production, and neither country seems willing to accept 
the role of junior partner to the other, economically or politically. Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia cannot align too closely with a country which has economic and diplomatic ties 
(though not formal or at ambassadorial level) with Israel for fear of damaging relations 
with other Arab states. 
Iranls relations with Iraq have never been very cordial, and they became more strained 
when Iran announced its intention to fill the power vacuum after British withdrawal. In 
an effort to discredit Iran and its Intentions, Iraq condemned the myth of a I~acuum of 
power" and any attempt being made to fill this alleged vacuum as an Anglo-US imperialist 
attempt to maintain Influence in the region. Iran, on the other had, accused Iraq of 
appealing to the potentially radical elements in the region. Kuwait emerged as the focal 
point of this controversy because of the varied ehtnlc background of its population ~nd Its 
relative military weakness. Iraq sees Iran (and certain Arab countries as well) as q 
strong obstacle to any expansionist move toward Kuwait (a greater obstacle perhaps than an 
outside power which would be more cautious about becoming directly Involved in such a 
dispute). Iran, for Its part, could not sit idly by and have so much oil wealth fall into 
the hands of a "revolutlonary" Arab state that might use it against Iran. 
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Ocean, the Soviets ~eep a small permanent naval presence in the Arabian Sea and use the 
ships to "show the flag" In friendly parts of the area. 
A number of revolutionary possibilities exists within some of the littorals which would 
only attempt to seek expression if there were some form of anti-Western (e.g., Soviet) 
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presence in the Gulf. {The form of thIs presence may not be important. The British main-
~ained political and military stabilIty In the Gulf for a number of years merely by station-
Ing a couple of obsolete ships that could hardly be considered a potent military presence}. 
This appears to portend uncertainty for the Persian Gulf in the future insofar as the area 
Is tallormade for externally sponsored power plays. 
Although no external power has made a direct move into the Gulf, some muscle flexing has 
transpired. The British have attempted to malnt~ln an influence in the region even though 
they have actually departed. In part. this failure to make a clean break from Gulf affairs 
can be attributed to the Imprint of their presence which will linger for some time and In 
part. to their desire to have a friendly power or powers establish primacy. With the' 
exception of Saudi Arabia and Iran. this Is a sterlIng currency area, and any disruption of 
oil traffic out of the Gulf will have an adverse effect on Britain's balance of payments in 
addition to disrupting Its energy supplies. The embargo on Gulf oil shipments from Arab 
Gulf states In 1967 adequately proved this. The British only wished to relinquish their 
expensive military presence In the area-not their political or commerlcal interests. 
Recognizing the Impact of British withdrawal. the Gulf states have been observing US 
activity in the regIon In an attempt to determine how its policy toward the region might 
evolve. Late In 1971. it was alleged by some Arab newspapers that the Emirate of Sharjah w 
would lease an existing military base to an AmerIcan company. According to these reports, 
the base would be used by the company as an aircraft maintenance center in the Gulf region. 
On 24 November 1971. the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar cIted a statement allegedly made by Vice 
PresIdent Agnew that summer In which he was supposed to have stated that. although the 
UnIted States had no special polIcy concernIng the Gulf region after British withdrawal, it 
was interested In Increasing political influence In BahraIn. The Al-Nahar story went on to 
say that Mr. Agnew said the people of the region should manage their own affairs. but that 
the United States would remain on watch because It could not let the region's big oil tank 
burst into flames for domestic reasons or because of foreign complications. In addition. 
according to some unconfirmed reports in the Arab press. when the British evacuated Al-Hama-
lah and Al-Jafir bases on Bahrain. observers began noticing extensive US activity. The 
Arab press maintained this alleged activity was an effort by the United States to ensure that 
access to Persian Gulf port facilities would remain epen to US vessels after British with-
drawal. Some of these press assertions are clearly incorrect. On 6 January 1972, The New 
York Times reported on an executive agreement with Bahrain which was signed on 23 December 
1971. The agreement provides for continued use by the US Navy of a small portion of former 
British facilities under leasing arrangements for logistical support requirements. 
Although the agreement does not contain any political or military commitment to Bahrain. nor 
Imply any change In US policy. It does permit the continuance of a US naval presence in the 
Gulf which goes back for 20 years. 
For the present. Soviet activity In the Gulf has been mostly commercial In nature. 
Although a definite Soviet line to Persian Gulf 011 fields has not yet been established. 
Soviet actIvity In Iran and Iraq is proceeding in the direction. Notable accomplishments 
in Iran include the gas pIpeline from Persian Gulf 011 fields which terminates on the Caspian 
coast and the steel mill which the Soviets are constructing at Isfahan. More significant. 
In terms of a power move Into the Gulf region. is Soviet activity In Iraq. The 15-year 
treaty of friendship between the two coutnrles provides for the strengthening of Iraq's 
military defenses. Agreements to develop oil resources In Iraqi concession areas resulted 
in production from the Soviet-financed Rumeila 011 field. Shortly after the British with-
drawal announcement. a Tass statement was broadcast expressing concern over recent develop-
ments In the Gulf as they related to the security of the southern frontiers of the Soviet 
Union. The broadcast strongly objected to any attempts by Western powers to interfiere in ~ 
the affairs of the countries of the Persian Gulf region. stating that the people of this 
region have the rIght to determine their fate. Shortly after this. In May 1968. two Soviet 
ships called at Umm Qasr. Iraq's new port. making the fIrst Soviet naval presence in the 
Persian Gulf in over 60 years. 
Today. we have a situation in the Gulf where the great powers are proclaiming that the 
peoples of the Gulf states have the right conduct their affairs. At the same time, these 
powers are also moving. verbally or through direct actions. to ensure that their respective 
and sometime conflicting Interests In the region will not be jeopardized. It would seem that 
the extent to which a great power will insert Itself into the region will depend upon the 
actions of the littoral states toward maintaining stability. and upon the extent to which 
the great powers themselves perceive a need to influence the internal affairs of the littorals 
It is possible that this attitude of '~alt and see. but be prepared just In cas~1 will. in 
iteself. constitute a force sufficient to maintain stability. Nonetheless. It Is difficult 
to conceive of great powers remaining static vla-a-vls each other given the threats to 
equilIbrium which exist within and among the Gulf states. 
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25 lesser craft, its navy represents a sizable force by Gulf standards. None of the other 
Gulf states, Including Iraq, have naval vessels larger than patrol craft. Backed by an air 
force equipped with F40 and F5 fighters, Iranls military presence far exceeds any potential 
regional rival. 
The limiting factor facing Iran In ensuring stability in the Gulf is achieving the 
necessary degree of regional cooperations to do so. In an area where the guns of your 
neighbors worry you more than those "pointed: in your direction from afar, the emergenc, 
of a local power is looked upon with suspicion. For Iran, this suspicion stems not only 
from the natural distrust of the littoral Arab states, but also from Saudi Arabia which is 
considered an economic and political rival, and from Iraq whose differences with Iran stem 
from the Kurdish question, as well as from border and ideology disputes. Recent develop-
ments indicate Iran and Saudi Arabia have common interests in maintaining Gulf stability 
and keeping radical movements under control. However, because of their oil interests and 
traditional systems of government, a number of obstacles prevent complete cooperation. Even 
in a sellerls market, both countries see the United States as a significant and potential 
consumer for their expanded oil production, and neither country seems willing to accept 
the role of junior partner to the other, economically or politically. Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia cannot align too closely with a country which has economic and diplomatic ties 
(though not formal or at ambassadorial level) with Israel for fear of damaging relations 
with other Arab states. 
Iranls relations with Iraq have never been very cordial, and they became more strained 
when Iran announced its intention to fill the power vacuum after British withdrawal. In 
an effort to discredit Iran and its intentions, Iraq condemned the myth of a "vacuum of 
power" and any attempt being made to fill this alleged vacuum as an Anglo-US imperialist 
attempt to maintain influence In the region. Iran, on the other had, accused Iraq of 
appealing to the potentially radical elements in the region. Kuwait emerged as the focal 
point of this controversy because of the varied ehtnic background of its population and Its 
relative military weakness. Iraq sees Iran (and certain Arab. countries as well) as a 
strong obstacle to any expansionist move toward Kuwait (a greater obstacle perhaps than an 
outside power which would be more cautious about becoming directly involved in such a 
dispute). Iran, for its part, could not sit idly by and have so much oil wealth fall into 
the hands of a "revolutionary" Arab state that might use it against Iran. . ., 
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Ocean, the Soviets ~eep a small permanent naval presence in the Arabian Sea and use the 
ships to "show the flag" in friendly parts of the area. 
A number of revolutionary possibilities exists within some of the littorals which would 
only attempt to seek expression if there were some form of anti-Western (e.g., Soviet) 
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presence in the Gulf. (The form of this presence may not be Important. The British main-
~ained political and mllita~y stability In the Gulf for a number of years merely by station-
Ing a couple of obsolete ships that could hardly be considered a potent military presence). 
This appears to portend uncertainty for the Persian Gulf in the future insofar as the area 
Is tallormade for externally sponsored power plays. 
Although no external power has made a direct move into the Gulf, some muscle flexing has 
transpired. The British have attempted to maintain an influence in the region even though 
they have actually departed. In part, this failure to make a clean break from Gulf affairs 
can be attrl~uted to the Imprint of their presence which will linger for some time and, in 
part, to their desire to have a friendly power or powers establish primacy. With the 
exception of Saudi ArabIa and Iran, thIs Is a sterling currency area, and any disruption of 
oil traffic out of the Gulf will have an adverse effect on Britalnls balance of payments in 
addition to disrupting its energy supplies. The embargo on Gulf oil shipments from Arab ~ 
Gulf states In 1967 adequately proved this. The British only wished to relinquish their 
expensive military presence In the area-not their political or commerlcal Interests. 
Recognizing the impact of British withdrawal, the Gulf states have been observing US 
activity In the region In an attempt to determine how its policy toward the region might 
evolve. Late In 1971, it was alleged by some Arab newspapers that the Emirate of Sharjah ~ 
would lease an existing military base to an American company. According to these reports, 
the base would be used by the company as an aircraft maintenance center in the Gulf region. 
On 24 November 1971, the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar cited a statement allegedly made by Vice 
President Agnew that summer In which he was supposed to have stated that, although the 
United States had no special policy concerning the Gulf region after British withdrawal, it 
was Interested in Increasing political Influence in Bahrain. The Al-Nahar story went on to 
say that Mr. Agnew said the people of the region should manage their own affairs, but that 
the United States would remain on watch because It could not let the regionls big oil tank 
burst into flames for domestic reasons or because of foreign complications. In addition, 
according to some unconfirmed reports in the Arab press, when the British evacuated Al-Hama-
lah and Al-Jafir bases on Bahrain, observers began noticing extensive US activity. The 
Arab press maintained this alleged activity was an effort by the United States to ensure that 
access to Persian Gulf port facilities would remain epen to US vessels after British with-
drawal. Some of these press assertions are clearly Incorrect. On 6 January 1972, The New 
York Times reported on an executive agreement with Bahrain which was signed on 23 December 
1971. The agreement provides for continued use by the US Navy of a small portion of former 
British facilities under leasing arrangements for logistical support requirements. 
Although the agreement does not contain any political or military commitment to Bahrain, nor 
Imply any change in US policy, It does permit the continuance of a US naval presence in the 
Gulf which goes back for 20 years. 
For the present, Soviet activity In the Gulf has been mostly commercial in nature. 
Although a definite Soviet line to Persian Gulf 011 fields has not yet been established, 
Soviet activity In Iran and Iraq is proceeding In the direction. Notable accomplishments 
in Iran include the gas pipeline from Persian Gulf 011 fields which terminates on the Caspian 
coast and the steel mill which the Soviets are constructing at Isfahan. More significant, 
In terms of a power move Into the Gulf region, is Soviet activity In Iraq. The IS-year 
treaty of friendship between the two coutnrles provides for the strengthening of Iraqis 
military defenses. Agreements to develop 011 resources In Iraqi concession areas resulted 
in production from the Soviet-financed Rumeila 011 field. Shortly after the British with-
drawal announcement, a Tass statement was broadcast expressing concern over recent develop-
ments In the Gulf as they related to the security of the southern frontiers of the Soviet 
Union. The broadcast strongly objected to any attempts by Western powers to interfere in ~ 
the affairs of the countries of the Persian Gulf region, stating that the people of this 
region have the right to determine their fate. Shortly after this, in May 1968, two Soviet 
ships called at Umm Qasr, Iraqis new port, making the first Soviet naval presence in the 
Persian Gulf In over 60 years. 
Today, we have a situation In the Gulf where the great powers are proclaiming that the 
peoples of the Gulf states have the right conduct their affairs. At the same time, these 
powers are also moving, verbally or through direct actions, to ensure that their respective 
and sometime conflicting Interests in the region will not be jeopardized. It would seem that 
the extent to whIch a great power wIll insert Itself into the region will depend upon the 
actions of the littoral states toward maintaining stability, and upon the extent to which 
the great powers themselves perceive a need to influence the Internal affairs of the littorals 
It is possible that this attitude of "wait and see, but be prepared just in case" will. in 
Iteself, constitute a force sufficient to maintain stability. Nonetheless. It is difficult 
to conceive of great powers remaining static via-a-vls each other given the threats to 
equilibrium which exist within and among the Gulf states. 
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CONCLUSION 
The situation in the Persian Gulf region is not one from which a new equilibrium is 
likely to emerge In orderly fashion. For a great power to act as though a power vacuum 
existed in the Gulf could be dangerous. Simply stated, the Persian Gulf does not contain 
a power vacuum when considered as a separte regional entity. But, when the region is 
placed into an international context (because of its 011 resources and strategic location), 
great powers perceive a power vacuum and, therefore, think in terms of exerting some 
influence in the region. 
The changing political situation in the Persian Gulf is exacerbated by the polarity 
impl icit in Arab national ism and the Arab-Israel i confl ict. The "have" countries in the 
region are, for the most part, traditional monarchies of a stable political situation and 
evolutionary change. With the exception of Jordan, they are supported by the West. The 
"have not" countries, though not necessarily bordering the Gulf, are "Socialist" and in 
favor of revolutionary change. These countries are generall~ supported by the Soviet Union. 
Socialist Arab nationalists tend to equate anti-imperialism with being anti-West. With 
the exception of Libya and Sudan, these countries have not yet come to regard Soviet 
interests in the region as neocolonialism or modern imperialism. By supporting one or 
the other side of this Arab nationalist polarity. the great powers have accentuated Soviet-
American rivalry. hence the polarity of the region. 
A possibility worth considering is that the juxtaposition of interests in the Gulf may 
provide for a local "balance of power" which would provide stability. The many threats to 
regional stability could become mutually countervailing. If Iran were to attempt to reassert 
its claim to Bahrain, Saudi Arabia would support Bahrain. If Iraq were to make noises 
directed towa rd occupy i ng Kuwa It, Saud I Arab i a and I ran wou 1 d move to support Kuwa it. If, 
in the unlikely event, Saudi Arabia were to press the Buraimi Oasis issue, it could 
expect strong objection from Iraq. 
Notwithstanding the disruptive possibilites of oil and the wealth derived from it, the 
presence of 011 In the Persian Gulf region represents a source of stability. Recent events 
indicate that countries In which oil reserves are located will continue their efforts toward 
acquiring increasing control and ownership of oil-produclng capability. WIth the achievement 
of this control. the countries concerned will have an even greater interest in maintaining 
or increasing oil production, thus will act more rationally. Overriding all other consider-
ations, Persian Gulf oil-producing countries are in concert with Western consuming countires 
over their mutual interest in an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and in the 
perpetuation of the political stability which has existed in the region since the beginning 
of the century." (MILITARY REVIEW, October, 1973) 
FEATURE: MAN MADE STAR 
"The navigator's responsibility for getting his ship from "here" to "there" has always 
been a case of careful mathematics and respectful attention to the stars and his charts. 
To assist the navigator and his quartermasters. a new aid is appearing in the chart room 
adding a degree of accuracy unmatched in the past. One aid is called the AN/SRN-9 SATNAV 
receiver, and it can hand the navigator a positive fix on his present position, exact to 
within lOO-yards. 
The ship-board unit is the final link to the Navy Navigation Satellite System (NNSS) 
based at Point Mugu. California. At the center of the system are six active satellites 
In near-polar orbit 600 miles above the earth and traveling four miles a second. 
The Transit satellites are fed navigational information by Point Mugu and in turn 
broadcast to the fleet around the clock. 
Information of the ship's approximate location and other data is given to a small ship-
board computer. When a Transit satellite is in poltion overhead electronic wizardry takes 
over where man once struggled with sextant in hand. 
The SATNAV receiver Is turned on to listen to the signals of the 120-pound satellite 
as the two are within range of each other. What the receiver "hears" is a series of 
continuous wave. phase-modulated signals that locate the satellite in space. At the same 
time the receiver measures frequency changes taking place during Tansit's broadcast. 
These frequency changes, called doppler shift, serve as a measure with which to locate 
the position of the ship in relation to the known position of the satellite. Mixing the 
satellite's broadcasted information with that put into the computer by the navigator, a 
"very accurate" fix of the ship;s location prints out in a matter of moments. 
The SRN-9 does not replace the sextant, but it is used frequently on board in addition 
to other more conventional means of obtaining a fix on the cruiser's position. 
In addition to its exactness, the SATNAV offers the opportunity to fix location without 
regard to weather or time of day. A chart of the times Transit satellites would pass over-
head is kept handy, and depending on the latitude of the ship's operating area, contact 
can be made on the average of two to three hours (the further away from the equator. the 
mor.e often contact can be made). 
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As with other forms of electronic navigation, SATNAV shipboard units operate in the 
passive mode, without signal output from the ship, offering protection from enemy detection 
equipment. 
Three other receivers are currently available to navigators in addition to the AN/SRN-9. 
They are the Magnavox Mode 702A-3, the prototype model SRN-9 called the XN-5 and the light-
weight 10-pound Transim Model. 
Installation of the SATNAV receivers and personnel training is conducted by Tiger 
Teams from the Navyls Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Silver Springs, Maryland. 
"' 
So far in CRUDESPAC, SATNAV units are used aboard the nuclear-powered guided missile fri-
gates USS BAINBRIDGE (DLGN 25) and USS TRUXTUN (DLGN 35), the nuclear-powered guided missile 
cruiser USS LONG BEACH (CGN 9), the guided missile light cruiser OKLAHMOA CITY (CG 5), 
and USS CHICAGO (CG-ll). and several guided missile frigates. 
At sea, the SATNAV units are used up to 90 percent of the time in conjunction with 
visual and other electronic means. The SATNAV receiver unit is accurate, hardest to jam 
and is available world-wide. 
When a ship is told to find a spot on the ocean it can meet a rendezvous requirement from 
within one-tenth to three-tenths of a nautical mile depending on the model. 
A civilian version of the world-wide, all weather satellite navigation system has been 
made available based on the Navy SATNAV. This precise navigation aid is widely used by other 
governmental gaencies, the Merchant Marine as well as industry and in institutional research. 
Areas of use for civilian versions of the SATNAV in addition to commerical shipping include 
off-shore oil and mineral exploration, oceanorgraphic research, coastal charting and in 
transoceanic cable laying. 
Still, the primary means of fixing a shipls location remains to the world of man and 
the stars that have guided sailors across the seas of the world for as long as ships put to 
sea. As the requirements of the Navy become more and more complex, it is to technology that 
man turns, increasing his ability to reach out across the oceans to subdue the seas and 
ensure the strength of Navy sea power around the world. 11 (VIGILANCE, MARCH 1974) 
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